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Edwards: Cybersecurity Oversight Liability

CYBERSECURITY OVERSIGHT LIABILITY
Benjamin P. Edwards*
ABSTRACT
A changing cybersecurity environment now poses a significant
corporate-governance challenge. Although some cybersecurity data
breaches may be inevitable, courts now increasingly consider when a
corporation’s officers and directors may be held liable on theories
that they acted in bad faith and failed to adequately oversee the
corporation’s affairs. This short essay reviews recent derivative
decisions and encourages corporate boards to recognize that in an
environment filled with increasing threats, a reasonable response will
require devoting real resources and attention to cybersecurity issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, data breaches and cybersecurity failures cause
significant damage to American consumers and corporations.1
Consider the harm from data breaches at Equifax, Inc. (Equifax)
alone. In 2017, Equifax “announced a cybersecurity incident
potentially impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers.”2 It
also revealed that “credit card numbers for approximately 209,000
U.S. consumers, and certain dispute documents with personal
identifying information for approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers,
were accessed.”3 Putting the harm to consumers aside, the data
breach did enormous damage to Equifax’s shareholders, erasing $6
billion in market capitalization.4 As with many data breaches, the
revelation also triggered additional significant liabilities, including
shareholder derivative actions.5
Notably, Equifax has not been the only company to have its
valuation drop because of cybersecurity failures.6 After Yahoo’s
1. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2017 ANNUAL DATA BREACH YEAR-END REVIEW (2018),
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2017Breaches/2017AnnualDataBreachYearEndReview.pd
f [https://perma.cc/PB2Y-DF5E] (“The number of U.S. data breach incidents tracked in 2017 hit a new
record high of 1,579 breaches.”).
2. Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer
Information (Sept. 7, 2017), https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-07-2017213000628 [https://perma.cc/PB2Y-DF5E].
3. Id.
4. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Michael Rapoport & Robert McMillan, ‘We’ve Been Breached’: Inside
the Equifax Hack, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weve-beenbreached-inside-the-equifax-hack-1505693318 [https://perma.cc/AD6C-7GNQ] (“[I]nvestors have
shrunk Equifax’s stock-market value by about $6 billion, or more than a third, in the past [ten] days.”).
5. Meena Yoo, Director Liability in a Data Breach Era, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (Nov. 6,
2017),
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2017/11/06/director-liability-in-a-data-breach-era/
[https://perma.cc/NLM7-BBM8] (“Equifax faces an FTC investigation, congressional hearings, class
actions[,] and derivative suits. However, its executives will likely escape liability.”).
6. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1285 (2017)
(“Yahoo faces the loss of $350 million from the proposed renegotiated Verizon acquisition. Under the
renegotiated deal, Yahoo shareholders stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars of value due to
management’s cybersecurity failures, which may become the source of a shareholder derivative cause of
action.”).
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record-setting hack in 2014, Verizon renegotiated its asset purchase
deal to trim the price paid by $350 million.7 In practical effect,
Yahoo’s shareholders suffered a $350 million loss because the
reduced purchase price meant that each shareholder received less
than he or she would have had the data breaches not occurred or been
handled more effectively.8
Shareholder derivative litigation in the wake of a significant data
breach or cybersecurity incident has now become a predictable risk
for corporate directors.9 In recent years, shareholders have filed
lawsuits in the aftermath of data breaches at Yahoo, Target, Home
Depot, Wyndham, Wendy’s, and others.10 Although courts have
halted many suits on procedural grounds, past suits, the Yahoo
settlement, and increased awareness around cybersecurity issues now
place corporate directors on notice that cybersecurity concerns must
be taken seriously.11
This essay contributes to the conversation around cybersecurity
liability in shareholder derivative actions.12 It assesses current
shareholder efforts to hold corporate officers and directors
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Target Corporation Cybersecurity-Related Derivative Litigation
Dismissed, D&O DIARY (July 9, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/07/articles/cyberliability/target-corporation-cybersecurity-related-derivative-litigation-dismissed/
[https://perma.cc/A36F-PZDE] (“For some time now, many commentators, including me, have been
predicting that cybersecurity-related litigation could become an important part of the D&O litigation
environment.”).
10. See Cyber Breaches: Lessons Learned from Shareholder Derivative and Securities Fraud
Litigation, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 2–6 (May 1, 2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alertmemos-2018/cyber-breaches-lessons-learned-from-shareholder-derivative-and-securities-fraudlitigation-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWC3-ZANG] [hereinafter Cyber Beaches].
11. See id. at 1 (“[A]s cybersecurity issues become more ubiquitous, directors and officers will be
increasingly on notice of data breach risks, and plaintiffs will more easily be able to argue that directors
and officers should have been aware of the company’s susceptibility to cyberattack and should have
taken efforts to remedy the company’s vulnerabilities.”).
12. Although discussions about how to appropriately shape derivative liability for cybersecurity
failures remains at an early stage, some commentators now view a corporate board being held liable for
a cybersecurity failure as inevitable. See Benjamin Dynkin & Barry Dynkin, Derivative Liability in the
Wake of a Cyber Attack, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 23, 44 (2018) (“With the ever-rising number of data
breaches, it is inevitable that a case will arise in which the [b]usiness [j]udgment [r]ule and the [d]emand
requirement will not impede a claim, and [d]irectors will be held liable for insufficient or improper
action or inaction.”).
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accountable for cybersecurity failures under state corporate law and
how increasingly pervasive and salient cybersecurity risk may alter
judicial thinking. Part II briefly reviews the framework for oversight
liability in shareholder derivative cases.13 Part III examines recent
shareholder derivative actions arising out of cybersecurity failures
and data breaches.14 Part IV concludes by encouraging corporate
boards to devote additional resources to cybersecurity as risks
increase.15
I. The Oversight Liability Framework
Directors concerned about expanding shareholder liability for
cybersecurity breaches may take some refuge behind the procedural,
prudential, and substantive barriers insulating them from liability.16
This Part briefly overviews the demand requirement, the business
judgment rule, and the substantive standards commonly applied in
shareholder derivative cases alleging some form of corporate
oversight failure.
A. General Procedural Barriers
At the outset, a shareholder seeking to assert the corporation’s
rights in a derivative action must comply with general standing
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 4 (4th ed. 2019). Although a cybersecurity breach
may lead plaintiffs to file securities fraud actions as well, this article confines its focus to shareholder
derivative actions alleging a breach of the duty of loyalty under state corporate law. For more
information on the new event-driven, securities-litigation phenomenon, see John C. Coffee Jr., The
Changing Character of Securities Litigation in 2019: Why It’s Time to Draw Some Distinctions, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/22/the-changingcharacter-of-securities-litigation-in-2019-why-its-time-to-draw-some-distinctions/
[https://perma.cc/M2RP-DLXV]. (“[T]he contemporary securities litigation playing field is dominated
by three very different categories of cases: (1) traditional securities cases, which have grown both in
number and even more in size; (2) merger objection cases, which characteristically have low merit but
nonetheless give plaintiffs some leverage because of the defendants’ fear of any disruption in the timing
of their merger; and (3) event-driven cases, where the legal standards are not yet clear because few of
these cases have yet produced an appellate decision.”).
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requirements, including continuous share ownership and the demand
requirement.17 Even in instances where a court allows a shareholderplaintiff to proceed because demand would be futile, the business
judgment rule or other limitations on derivative suits often cause
courts to defer to corporate boards and dismiss derivative claims.18
1. The Demand Requirement
Because corporate law gives the power to manage a corporation to
its board of directors, courts generally require shareholder plaintiffs
to provide some compelling reason for allowing a shareholder to
pursue a derivative action instead of simply allowing the board of
directors to proceed as it sees fit.19 Under Delaware law, a
shareholder plaintiff lacks standing unless she first makes a demand
on the board of directors to pursue a claim or otherwise shows that
she should not have to make demand because demand would be
futile.20 Most shareholder plaintiffs avoid making demand on the
board and attempt to plead demand futility in the hopes that a court
will excuse them from having to comply with the requirement.21
Delaware courts evaluate demand futility differently depending on
the nature of the challenge to the board. If a shareholder plaintiff
seeks to challenge some actual decision made by the board, courts
17. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 772–73 (Del. 1990) (“A basic principle of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation.”). Shareholder derivative claims assert power normally
belonging to a corporation’s board of directors. Id. at 773. To protect the board’s ability to manage a
corporation, courts impose significant limits on derivative actions. See id.
18. See John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV.
327, 353 (2016) (explaining that there are “a panoply of devices supposedly designed to avoid the
dreaded strike suit, with the result that the current path to resolution of derivative claims is not a straight
line. Rather, a series of sidebar skirmishes now condemns the derivative claim to a circuitous route of
substantive non-resolution.”).
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2019).
20. See Collins J. Seitz, Jr. & S. Michael Sirkin, The Demand Review Committee: How It Works, and
How It Could Work Better, 73 BUS. LAW. 305, 306 (2018) (“The demand requirement balances the
board’s statutory authority and its accountability to the corporation and its stockholders. It requires a
stockholder who seeks to litigate derivatively on the corporation’s behalf to first demand that the board
pursue the claim, unless she can plead particularized facts tending to show that demand would be
futile.”).
21. Id.
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apply the test announced in Aronson v. Lewis.22 That test asks a court
to consider “whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a
reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested
and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”23 A different test
from Rales v. Blasband applies “where the board that would be
considering the demand did not make a business decision which is
being challenged in the derivative suit.”24 The Rales test may come
into play in instances where: (1) most of the board has turned over,
leaving new directors in charge; (2) the suit challenges something
other than a business decision made by the board; or (3) a suit
challenges a decision made by a different business entity that was
acquired by the corporation.25 The Rales test asks a court to
“determine whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a
derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as of
the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business
judgment in responding to a demand.”26
These tests effectively winnow out many claims. Shareholder
claims may be more likely to proceed if they can show that “a
majority of the board is biased by factors such as familial, financial,
professional, and social ties or faces a real risk of personal liability
for non-exculpated claims.”27
2. The Business Judgment Rule
In instances where derivative plaintiffs challenge some decision
made by the board of directors, courts often apply the business

22. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
23. Id.
24. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993).
25. Id. at 934.
26. Id.
27. Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1583, 1634 (2018).
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judgment rule to defer to the board’s discretion.28 Although the
precise contours of the business judgment rule have been widely
debated, many see it as “a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which
courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting
preconditions for review are satisfied.”29
Delaware’s Chancellor Allen described the business judgment rule
as providing “that where a director is independent and disinterested,
there can be no liability for corporate loss, unless the facts are such
that no person could possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she
were attempting in good faith to meet their duty.”30 In practical
terms, this generally means that, absent evidence of some improper
motive, courts will tend to defer to the business decisions made by
boards of directors.31 This effectively insulates directors from having
their decisions second-guessed by courts simply because something
unfortunate happened to the corporation.
B. The Substantive Standard
Although shareholder plaintiffs may pursue a variety of different
theories in the wake of a cybersecurity incident, most claims tend to
focus on oversight liability or the duty to monitor, which may be the
“‘the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win a judgment.’”32 Establishing an oversight claim
requires shareholder-derivative plaintiffs to show not just that the
board made some mistake but that they acted in bad faith.33 In Stone
28. Id. at 1629.
29. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV.
83, 87 (2004).
30. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996).
31. Id. at 1053. The court further explained:
Obviously, it is in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer sufficient
protection to directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to
conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith
and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a
result of a business loss.
Id. at 1052.
32. City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 55 (Del. 2017) (quoting
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
33. Id.
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v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted Caremark’s34 general
standard for oversight liability.35 There, it held:
Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for
director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls;
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or
problems requiring their attention. In either case,
imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations.36
In adopting the standard, the Delaware Supreme Court reframed
Caremark and situated it as a part of the general duty of loyalty,
placing it outside the reach of exculpation clauses under Delaware
corporate law.37 In essence, corporate boards must take some steps to
monitor and oversee the corporation’s functions and reporting
systems and pay some level of attention to information generated by

34. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated
upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability.
Id.
35. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
36. Id. at 370.
37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2019) (precluding a corporate charter from eliminating
or limiting director liability “[f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders”); Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts, Confidentiality, and other Concerns: The Promise and
Peril for Lawyers Serving on Corporate Boards, 64 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3, 3–20 (2018)
(“corporate law often imposes a non-waivable duty of loyalty to the corporation”). Of course, not all
states follow Delaware. Nevada, for instance, only imposes liability for a liability for a breach of the
duty of loyalty if there is “intentional misconduct, fraud[,] or a knowing violation of law.” NEV. REV.
STAT. § 78.138(7) (2018).
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those systems. Ultimately, Caremark may “demand almost nothing
beyond asking that some compliance system exists.”38
II. Recent Decisions in Cybersecurity Cases
Despite the difficulties involved in pressing a derivative claim for
some corporate oversight failure, shareholders have brought suits
alleging oversight liability after many significant cybersecurity
failures.39 This Part reviews some relatively recent cases and pulls
guidance from these decisions for corporate boards considering how
to address the cybersecurity challenge.
A. Wyndham
Between 2008 and 2010, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation
(Wyndham) repeatedly lost information to hackers.40 After the data
breach emerged, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an
enforcement action against Wyndham over its security practices.41 In
2012, a Wyndham shareholder wrote to Wyndham’s board and
demanded that it instigate litigation based on the breaches and on
account of its inadequate data security.42 In response to the demand,
Wyndham’s board of directors met and considered the request before
ultimately deciding not to pursue the claims suggested by the
shareholder’s demand.43 After the board refused to act on the
shareholder’s demand, the shareholder filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.44

38. Donald C. Langevoort, Symposium, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90
TEMP. L. REV. 727, 729–30 (2018).
39. Claire Loebs Davis, 5 Securities Litigation Issues to Watch in 2016, LANEPOWELL (Jan. 19,
2016),
https://www.dandodiscourse.com/2016/01/19/5-securities-litigation-issues-to-watch-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/5VMK-USFB].
40. Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14-CV-01234 SRC, 2014 WL 5341880, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014)
(“On three occasions between April 2008 and January 2010, that information was stolen. Hackers
breached WWC’s main network and those of its hotels.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id.
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The court reviewed Wyndham’s decision not to act on the
shareholder’s demand under the deferential business judgment
standard.45 It found that the board had conducted a reasonable
investigation before it rejected the plaintiff’s demand.46 At the outset,
the board was already well familiar with the cybersecurity issues and
“had already discussed the cyber-attacks at fourteen meetings from
October 2008 to August 2012.”47 Additionally, the board’s audit
committee had also discussed the cybersecurity issues at length, and
Wyndham had hired third-party experts to investigate and issue
cybersecurity recommendations.48 Given the amount of information
in the board’s hands and the steps it had taken to address the issue,
the court simply applied the business judgment rule and dismissed
the claim.49
B. Target
In 2013, Target fell victim to cyber thieves who obtained personal
and financial information for millions of Target’s customers.50 After
shareholders filed five different derivative actions and delivered one
demand to the board, Target created the “Special Litigation
Committee”51 (SLC) to investigate and vested it with full power over
the issue.52 The SLC conducted an enormous investigation and, in a
ninety-one-page report, ultimately concluded that it would not be in
Target’s best interest to pursue litigation against its officers and
directors.53 In reaching this conclusion, the SLC reviewed Target’s
45. Id. at *3 (citing Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773–74 (Del. 1990)) (“If a board of directors
refuses to pursue a shareholder’s demand, that decision falls under the purview of the ‘business
judgment rule.’”).
46. Palkon, 2014 WL 5341880, at *4.
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *7.
50. Memorandum of Law of the Special Litig. Comm. of the Bd. of Dirs. of Target Corp. in Support
of its Motion for Approval and Dismissal at 2, Davis v. Steinhafel, No. 0:14-cv-00203-PAM-JJK (D.
Minn. May 6, 2016), 2016 WL 2905335 [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
51. For general information about special litigation committees, see Charles W. Murdock, Corporate
Governance—The Role of Special Litigation Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79 (1993).
52. Memorandum of Law, supra note 50, at 3, 5.
53. Id. at 2.
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data security before the breach and the significant changes made after
the incident.54 At the SLC’s request and without any opposition from
the plaintiffs, the court ultimately dismissed the derivative
litigation.55
C. Home Depot
In 2014, Home Depot revealed that it had suffered one of the
largest data breaches in history with hackers obtaining access to fiftysix million customer credit card numbers.56 Hackers exploited a
vulnerability at a third-party vendor and then used the vendor’s
access to Home Depot’s network to install malware and steal data
from Home Depot.57 Shareholder derivative claims soon followed,
alleging that Home Depot’s board “breached their duty of loyalty to
Home Depot because [they] failed to institute internal controls
sufficient to oversee the risks that Home Depot faced in the event of
a breach and because they disbanded a [b]oard of [d]irectors
committee that was supposed to have oversight of those risks.”58
The Northern District of Georgia ultimately dismissed the claims
because the plaintiffs failed to establish that demand was futile.59
Applying Delaware law and following Rales, the court explained that
pleading demand futility would require the plaintiffs to allege
particularized facts creating “‘a reasonable doubt that, as of the time
the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in
responding to a demand.’”60 In assessing the demand-futility standard
for the oversight claim, the court explained that the “[p]laintiffs
54. Id.
55. See Cyber Breaches, supra note 10, at 3.
56. Kevin LaCroix, Home Depot Settles Data Breach-Related Derivative Lawsuit, D&O DIARY
(May 1, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/05/articles/cyber-liability/home-depot-settles-databreach-related-derivative-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/YD75-UDQR].
57. In re Home Depot, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2016)
(“The hackers used a third-party vendor’s user name and password to enter into Home Depot’s
network.”).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1332.
60. Id. at 1324 (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (emphasis removed)).
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essentially need to show with particularized facts beyond a
reasonable doubt that a majority of the [b]oard faced substantial
liability because it consciously failed to act in the face of a known
duty to act.”61
Although the facts alleged did not clear the “incredibly high
hurdle” for pleading demand futility in this context, the court did
criticize the board’s conduct.62 In “hindsight” it noted that “the
implementation of the plan [to fix security problems] was probably
too slow[] and that the plan probably would not have fixed all of the
problems Home Depot had with its security.”63 The court stressed
that boards do not need to make perfect decisions—simply
reasonable ones.64 Under Delaware law, so long as outside directors
“pursued any course of action that was reasonable, they would not
have violated their duty of loyalty,” even if other actions would have
been better.65
D. Yahoo
Breaking new ground as the first data-breach derivative settlement
to recover funds for shareholders, Yahoo paid out $29 million in
monetary damages, settling allegations that Yahoo’s directors
breached their fiduciary duties.66 Over a period of years, Yahoo
suffered a series of massive data breaches affecting over one billion
user accounts, setting a series of records for the largest data breaches
ever announced.67 The derivative suits alleged that the Yahoo
defendants knew about the data breaches long before revealing the
61. Id. at 1325.
62. Id.
63. In re Home Depot, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
64. Id. (quoting Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)).
65. Id. at 1326 (emphasis removed).
66. Craig A. Newman, Lessons for Corporate Boardrooms from Yahoo’s Cybersecurity Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/business/dealbook/yahoo-cybersecurity-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/26YB-UBJM] (explaining that the Yahoo settlement “marked
the first time that shareholders have been awarded a monetary damages in a derivative lawsuit related to
a data breach”).
67. For a discussion of the Yahoo breaches in greater detail and context, see Trautman, supra note 6,
at 1233–34.
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information to the public and that they sought to cover up and hide
the breach.68 The settlement stands out for a number of reasons. As
Kevin LaCroix highlighted:
[T]here are certain features of the Yahoo situation that may
make the circumstances somewhat unique. For starters, it
appears to involve the largest ever data breach. There also
is the very unfortunate circumstance of the long lag-time
between the date of the breach and the time when Yahoo
finally got around to disclosing the breach. Moreover, there
is the very specific aspect of the case in which Verizon
renegotiated the price of its asset acquisition, reducing the
value of the deal by $350 million, which represented a very
significant and undeniable financial consequence resulting
from the data breach. Few other cases are going to involve
anything like this combination of circumstances.69
The Yahoo derivative litigation may have also settled for real
money because of statements in Yahoo’s $35 million settlement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).70 In particular, the
SEC found that “Yahoo senior management . . . did not properly
assess the scope, business impact, or legal implications of the breach,
including how and where the breach should have been disclosed in
Yahoo’s public filings.”71 The SEC also declared that Yahoo’s
“senior management and legal teams” learned “[w]ithin days” about
the information security team’s discovery of the breaches in

68. Kevin LaCroix, Yahoo Data Breach-Related Derivative Suit Settled for $29 Million, D&O
DIARY (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/01/articles/cyber-liability/yahoo-data-breachrelated-derivative-suit-settled-29-million/#more-17535 [https://perma.cc/F9PN-84ES] (explaining that
the suits alleged that Yahoo “knew about the data breaches long before they were disclosed to the public
and that instead of disclosing that the data breaches had taken place the defendants sought to cover up
the breaches”).
69. Id.
70. In the Matter of Altaba Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo! Inc., Respondent, Securities Act of 1933 Release
No. 3937, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ⁋ 75167 (Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter In the Matter of Altaba Inc.].
71. Id.
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December 2014.72 Attempting to explain the delay between discovery
and revelation, Yahoo’s 2016 Annual Report claimed that “certain
senior executives did not properly comprehend or investigate, and
therefore failed to act sufficiently upon, the full extent of knowledge
known internally” about the breach. 73 It also averred that its
independent committee “did not conclude that there was an
intentional suppression of relevant information.”74
Yahoo may have faced more significant risk from shareholder
oversight claims because the long delay between the internal
discovery and public revelation might allow a court to conclude that
Yahoo consciously disregarded the information that senior leaders
received about the breach. A court might be skeptical that Yahoo—a
data company―did not comprehend the implications of a data
breach.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, courts will often hesitate before imposing liability for a
cybersecurity failure because, in a real sense, a corporation suffering
a data breach is the victim of a crime. Yet there may be some
instances where courts should impose liability for cybersecurity
failures. Consider the equities in an analogous situation. If bandits
attack and loot a trade caravan, the organizers of the expedition suffer
alongside its investors and passengers. The caravan’s masters should
not be held personally liable to investors simply because bad things
happened. The world is full of risks. On the other hand, investors
have a legitimate grievance if a caravan knowingly enters dangerous
territory without acquiring at least some reasonable degree of
protection. Because well-organized brigands may overwhelm even a

72. Id.
73. Yahoo!
Inc.,
Annual
Report
47
(Form
10-K)
(Mar.
1,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312517065791/d293630d10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/GW6D-6KU7].
74. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/3

2017),
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reasonable complement of guards, courts should not second-guess
most security decisions.
Yet as cybersecurity incidents accumulate, the floor for a
reasonable data security program must rise. The risks facing large
corporate operations now grow increasingly well-known and salient.
Good-faith operations will pay serious attention to these risks. A
corporate board that neglects the issue and ignores recommendations
and requests from its cybersecurity staff does so at its peril. At the
least, the Yahoo settlement counsels in favor of a robust reaction to
the discovery of a data breach.75
In the final analysis, state corporate law’s influence and the threat
of shareholder oversight claims may stand in the shadow of other
regulatory and market pressures driving corporate actors to improve
their cybersecurity operations. Notably, the SEC recently released a
report on cybersecurity connecting cybersecurity to issuers’
obligations to maintain adequate internal controls.76 These and other
efforts to increase data security may apply greater pressure than state
corporate law. As regulators ramp up their activities in this space,
their findings and enforcement actions may also provide key facts
and insights for shareholder plaintiffs considering oversight claims.

75. In the Matter of Altaba Inc., supra note 70.
76. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding Certain Cyber-Related Frauds Perpetrated Against Public companies and Related Internal
Accounting Controls Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 84429 (Oct. 16, 2018).
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